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Abstract
We investigate whether geographic representation affects local voting behavior in
closed-list proportional representation (PR) systems, where conventional theoreti-
cal wisdom suggests a limited role of localism in voter preferences. Using detailed
data on Norwegian parliamentary candidates’ hometowns, we show that parties
engage in geographic balancing when constructing candidate lists. However, be-
cause most districts contain more municipalities than seats, not all municipalities
will ultimately see a local candidate elected. A regression discontinuity design ap-
plied to marginal candidates reveals that parties obtain higher within-district sup-
port in subsequent elections in incumbents’ hometowns—novel evidence of “friends-
and-neighbors” voting in an otherwise party-centered environment. Exploring the
mechanisms, we find that represented municipalities often continue to have locally-
connected candidates in top positions, in contrast to municipalities with losing
candidates, and are more frequently referenced in legislative speeches. There is no
evidence that unequal representation creates inequalities in distributive policies.
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Scholars of democratic representation have long considered there to be an important link
between descriptive representation—the presence of politicians who come from various
backgrounds and group identities—and political engagement and participation by citizens
belonging to those groups (e.g., Mansbridge, 1999).1 This logic also applies to the descrip-
tive representation of geographical subconstituencies (such as cities and towns) within
legislative districts: although legislators are mandated to represent the entire district,
they naturally have closer ties and mobilizational strengths within their “hometown”
municipalities or regions (e.g., Key, 1949; Fenno, 1978). When districts contain more
municipalities than seats, not all municipalities will enjoy descriptive representation by
a locally-connected legislator—and this may influence political engagement and voting
behavior by local citizens across these geographical subconstituencies.
Indeed, numerous studies of voting behavior in various contexts have documented a
positive correlation between a candidate or legislator’s local ties (through birth or resi-
dence) and voter support in subregions within a district. Key (1949) famously attributes
this pattern to “friends-and-neighbors” voting, which may result from both the mobiliza-
tion of erstwhile non-voters and the persuasion of regular voters to switch allegiances in
favor of the local candidate. The potential mechanisms behind effect include stronger local
networks and mobilizational capacity (e.g., Hirano, 2006), greater attention to local issues
in campaign rhetoric or coverage in local news media (e.g., Bowler, Donovan and Snipp,
1993; Druckman, Kifer and Parkin, 2020), and voters’ expectations that locally-connected
legislators will share their values and policy preferences, or provide more locally-targeted
distributive benefits (e.g., Shugart, Valdini and Suominen, 2005; Campbell et al., 2019).
Whether friends-and-neighbors voting is driven by candidates’ efforts, voters’ expecta-
tions, or both, the conventional wisdom is that candidates and legislators will enjoy more
support in their hometowns relative to other parts of the district.
In this study, we use candidate-level and municipality-level data from Norwegian par-
1Evidence from various contexts suggests, for example, that the presence of women in politics activates
political interest and turnout by women in the population (e.g., Karp and Banducci, 2008; Bhalotra,
Clots-Figueras and Iyer, 2018), and related arguments have been made for racial and ethnic minorities
(e.g., Banducci, Donovan and Karp, 2004; Washington, 2006).
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liamentary elections to investigate whether descriptive representation of geographic sub-
constituencies (municipalities) has any effect on local voting behavior in closed-list pro-
portional representation (PR) elections, a setting which is common around the world but
has nevertheless been overlooked in the existing literature on friends-and-neighbors vot-
ing.2 Comparative theories of electoral systems and representation suggest that closed-list
PR elections should minimize localism in voting behavior, since voters cast their ballots
for parties rather than candidates, and legislators have incentives to pursue nationally-
oriented programmatic policies rather than locally-oriented particularistic policies (e.g.,
Carey and Shugart, 1995; Shugart, Valdini and Suominen, 2005)—but we so far lack
credible empirical evidence relating to this question.3
We first provide clear and novel empirical evidence that Norwegian parties engage in
geographic balancing in candidate nominations within districts, showing that the num-
ber of unique hometowns represented by candidates on party lists is larger than what
would result from random selection. We then use a regression discontinuity (RD) de-
sign to investigate whether gaining local representation affects municipality-level voting
behavior in the next election, finding that parties enjoy higher within-district support
in the hometowns of narrowly elected candidates. This represents the first credible evi-
dence of friends-and-neighbors voting in a closed-list PR system, and is noteworthy given
the conventional wisdom that localism in voting behavior should be diminished in this
party-centered context. Although it is not possible to entirely pin down the relative con-
tributions of mobilization and persuasion to the overall effect, we find no evidence that
2For example, friends-and-neighbors voting (or support for local candidates more generally) has been
documented in SMD settings (e.g., Rice and Macht, 1987; Arzheimer and Evans, 2012; Meredith, 2013;
Fiva and Smith, 2017a); in open-list PR settings (e.g., Tavits, 2010; Nemoto and Shugart, 2013; Saarimaa
and Tukiainen, 2016; Jankowski, 2016); in the single transferable vote (STV) setting of Ireland (Górecki
and Marsh, 2012); and in the single nontransferable vote (SNTV) setting of Japan (Hirano, 2006; Nemoto
and Shugart, 2013). Crisp and Desposato (2004) also document geographically-targeted behavior in the
case of Colombia, which the authors note is technically closed-list PR but functions in practice like SNTV
due to the prevalence of subparty lists.
3Legislators in closed-list PR systems often claim to care about local subconstituencies in surveys
and interviews (André and Depauw, 2018; Heidar and Karlsen, 2018), and there is some experimental
evidence that voters prefer legislators with local ties regardless of the electoral system context (Horiuchi,
Smith and Yamamoto, 2020). However, this kind of evidence cannot speak to the causal effects of local
representation on voting behavior.
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relative turnout in the municipality increases, which suggests that the presence of a local
incumbent might primarily serve to persuade the erstwhile supporters of other parties to
switch allegiances, rather than to mobilize previous abstainers.
Further exploring the mechanisms, we find that the hometowns of narrowly elected
candidates have a higher probability of continuing to have a local candidate at the top
of the party list in the next election (keeping them focal in campaigns), whereas the list
positions of locally-connected candidates tend to fall for the municipalities that narrowly
miss out on representation. Legislators’ hometowns receive more mentions in legislative
speeches relative to other municipalities, but we find no clear evidence that these mu-
nicipalities get any special benefits in terms of central-to-local redistribution. For three
separate distributive policy outcomes—national roads construction, central government
jobs, and investment funding—the effects are close to zero. Collectively, our analyses
therefore indicate that geographic representation in closed-list PR systems, at least in
the exemplary case of Norway, results in higher local support for parties without gener-
ating significant material inequalities in substantive representation across municipalities.
Empirical Case Setting: Norway
The data set for our main analysis covers the universe of candidates (N=46,257) par-
ticipating in Norwegian national parliamentary (Storting) elections from 1953 to 2013
(Fiva and Smith, 2017b). Because the data set includes information on the municipality
of residence for each candidate, it is well suited to analyzing the political consequences
of local representation. Before moving to the main empirical analysis, we describe the
institutional setting.
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Electoral system and party system
Proportional representation for electing legislators to the Storting was introduced in
1921.4 Originally, the seat allocation was determined through the D’Hondt method;
however, from the 1953 election onwards, seats have been allocated with the Modified
Sainte-Laguë method, which is more favorable to small parties. The 1953 electoral reform
also abolished a previous distinction between urban and rural electoral districts, such that
districts since 1953 correspond to the borders of Norway’s 19 regions (fylker).5 District
magnitude ranges from 4 to 16 seats, with an average of about 9 seats.6
A two-tier system was introduced in 1989. In the first tier, seats are allocated propor-
tionally to parties within each of the 19 districts based on party vote shares in the district.
In the second tier, adjustment seats are given to parties that are under-represented at
the national level once the first-tier seats have been allocated, provided that those parties
reach an electoral threshold of 4 percent of the national vote.7 From 1989 to 2001, there
were eight second-tier seats, which could be allocated to any district. Since 2005, there
is one second-tier seat per district (hence 19 adjustment seats in total). Party lists are
closed—each party puts forward a rank-ordered list of candidates in each of the districts,
and votes are cast for the party list as a whole.8
The party system has been relatively stable (Bergman and Strøm, 2011). The main
party cleavage runs between the left-leaning social democratic camp, consisting of the
Labor Party and Socialist Peoples’ Party/Socialist Left Party (founded in 1961), and the
right-leaning conservative camp, consisting of the Center Party (formerly the Farmer’s
Party), Christian Peoples’ Party, Liberal Party, Conservative Party, and Progress Party
4See Cox, Fiva and Smith (2019) on the adoption of PR, and Aardal (2002) or Fiva and Smith (2017b)
for historical overviews of Norway’s electoral systems.
5Bergen was a separate district until 1973.
6We exclude candidates from Oslo from the analysis due to lack of intra-district variation in hometown
municipality.
7The second-tier seat allocation follows mechanically from the electoral results. Hence, parties have
no control over which candidates win.
8Voters may cross names off of the list when they cast their ballots, but the rank order will only
be changed if at least half of all of the party’s voters make exactly the same change. This has never
happened, so the system is effectively closed-list.
4
(founded in 1973).9 Partisan identification among voters is generally high in the period
we study, despite some decline in recent decades (Bengtsson et al., 2013, p. 71).
Candidates’ hometown municipalities
Our measure of geographic affiliation (local ties) is the home municipality of the candi-
date. In the vast majority of cases, this is reported on the election ballot. In a few cases,
we have used home municipality reported in the previous or next election, or in elections
at the regional level. Candidates who report a hometown outside the election district are
not included. The exception is candidates who change their reported hometown when
going into national politics: if a candidate changes their “hometown” to the capital (Oslo)
or a municipality adjacent to the capital, but continues to run in another election district
outside of Oslo, we use the candidate’s original hometown.
On average, each district consists of 25 municipalities, but these vary dramatically in
population size (the median municipality has about 4,000 inhabitants, while the average
municipality has about 10,000 inhabitants). Municipalities have the responsibility for key
welfare services, such as childcare, education, and elderly assistance, and are financed
primarily from grants from the national government and regulated income taxes. In the
1950s, there were about 750 municipalities. A wave of mergers reduced this number to
about 450 in the 1960s and it has been relatively stable since.10 With only 150-169 seats
in parliament (in our sample period), most municipalities are not represented.
Candidate nominations and rank positions are determined within each district by
dues-paying party delegates at nominating conventions (Valen, Narud and Hardarson,
2000), meaning that the local party organization is responsible for the composition of
each list with respect to geography, age, gender, and other background characteristics.
Up until 1952, a residency requirement ensured that only candidates living in the district
9A few other small parties have also succeeded in winning seats in some elections. The left-right
cleavage has shifted somewhat in recent elections, after the Center Party joined the center-left coalition
in 2005.
10See left panel of Appendix Figure A.1. Another wave of mergers is currently being implemented,
and from 2020 onwards, the number of municipalities will be 356.
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could run for office. However, even after the abolishment of the residency requirement,
candidates are almost always residents of the districts where they run.11 Among elected
candidates, about 80 percent have a prior background in local assemblies.
Geographic balancing on party lists
If candidates have a mobilizational advantage in their hometowns, then we might expect
parties to take advantage of this by creating geographically balanced lists of candidates.
Parties might also face internal pressure from local activists and party branches to nom-
inate candidates from across the various subconstituencies of the electoral district.12
To explore whether parties engage in geographic balancing in candidate nominations,
we plot the number of municipalities in each district represented by candidates in the
top ten positions on the lists of the four largest parties against the expected number that
would be represented if candidates were randomly drawn from the district population.13
If parties did not geographically balance their tickets, but instead chose candidates at
random from the district, we would expect the scatter points to cluster around the dashed
45-degree line in Figure 1 (i.e., where representation, on average, corresponds to the
geographic composition of the population in the district). This is not the case. Instead,
we see that the vast majority of scatter points lie above the dashed line, indicating a
strong tendency for the four largest parties to balance their tickets geographically.14
We cannot say for certain how much of the motivation for this nomination behavior
is electoral strategy—winning more votes—and how much is the result of pressure from
local party activists or established norms within the party organization. The empirical
11See middle panel of Appendix Figure A.1. In a few cases, parties have allowed elite members to run
in a district other than their home district in order to increase their chances of election.
12Latner and McGann (2005, p. 712) consider these to be two distinct factors in explaining party’s
geographic balancing, and refer to them as “vote maximization” and “internal political competition.” We
view a failure to satisfy internal political competition as coming at a potential cost of vote maximization,
thus making vote maximization the general motivation behind the behavior.
13For each district-year we draw 100 random samples of ten candidates based on municipality pop-
ulation sizes. In each sample, we count the number of municipalities represented. Finally, we average
across the 100 samples to get the expectation.
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Figure 1: Geographic balancing of candidate nominations in the four largest parties
Note: The figure plots, for each of the four largest parties, the number of municipalities represented by candidates in the top
ten positions on the lists against the expected number from a random draw based on populations. The unit of observation
is the party-district-year level (N=1,085). At the dashed 45-degree line, municipalities are, on average, represented on the
list in proportion to their share of the district population.
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evidence in the next section, however, will shed light on whether parties have reason to
behave strategically when choosing between candidates from different hometowns.
Research Design
A major challenge in evaluating the effects of representation on voting behavior is the
nonrandom nature of candidate selection within parties. Indeed, we have just shown that
municipalities are not randomly represented on party lists, and the rank positions of the
candidates from those municipalities are also not randomly determined.
A party might nominate candidates with local ties to the communities where the
largest number of supporters reside, where it hopes to make inroads with new supporters,
or even where it lost supporters in the previous election (Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe, 2011;
Put, Maddens and Verleden, 2017). Similarly, locally-oriented policies implemented by
parties in power to win votes—such as social spending, jobs programs, and construction
of infrastructure—may be intertwined with those same parties’ recruitment strategies,
obfuscating the direction of causality. With a few notable exceptions (Hirano, 2011;
Fiva and Halse, 2016), this causal identification problem hampers the interpretation and
conclusions that can be drawn from the existing literature about the effects of descriptive
representation on local voting behavior or other political outcomes.15
The mechanics of the Norwegian electoral system provide the opportunity to plau-
sibly identify the causal effects of local representation on voting behavior under weak
assumptions. Our research design leverages two quasi-experimental events which result
in a municipality gaining representation in parliament: (1) a local candidate narrowly
wins a district (“first-tier”) seat in a close election; (2) a local candidate wins a national
(“second-tier”) adjustment seat. The first event captures the part of seat allocation out-
comes that can be considered as good as random when parties’ vote shares are sufficiently
15A handful of studies use similar designs to study intergovernmental transfers (e.g., Brollo and Nan-
nicini, 2012), but are more concerned with partisan alignment across levels of government than policy
outcomes across geographic subconstituencies owing to descriptive representation.
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close (Folke, 2014; Fiva and Smith, 2018), while the second event captures the fact that
it is almost impossible to predict ex ante which candidates will be awarded national ad-
justment seats, which are allocated based on parties’ “excess votes” after first-tier seats
are allocated.
Our analysis builds on the RD framework of Fiva and Smith (2018). While their
analysis is applied to the 1953-1981 period, before the introduction of adjustment seats,
we use data for the entire 1953-2013 period.16 Like Fiva and Smith (2018), we start by
identifying candidates, for each of the seven main parties, who are either next in line to
win a seat, or first in line to lose a first-tier seat.17 We then use party vote counts at the
district level to measure how far individual candidates are from losing or winning a seat
using the distance measure proposed by Folke (2014). In short, we generate a win margin
for each candidate, which is defined as the minimum total vote change across all parties,
scaled by the total number of votes cast, that would be required for candidate i in party
p in municipality m at time t to experience a seat change. Based on this individual-level
variable, we measure how far the municipality is from losing or winning a first-tier seat
in parliament (henceforth, Marginmt).
Table 1 illustrates that municipalities can easily be left without representation under
closed-list PR. In this hypothetical example, half of the municipalities are left without
representation. In our actual empirical application, the number of municipalities exceeds
the number of seats available in the district by a factor of 2.5, on average, and less than 25
percent of municipalities are represented in parliament in a given year.18 As an illustration
of how we construct our forcing variable for the RD design, consider municipalities c and
f in Table 1. If party C had successfully mobilized 4,001 additional voters, the first-
16Fiva and Smith (2018), who study the incumbency advantage and dynasty formation, end their
analysis in 1981 primarily because they need a sufficiently large period after candidates have run in
order for family members to potentially appear in the data.
17We also include the Norwegian Communist Party in the 1953 and 1957 elections, and the New
People’s Party in the 1973 and 1977 elections.
18See right panel of Appendix Figure A.1. Other Western European parliaments elected with closed-
list PR similarly have fewer seats than municipalities. For example, in Portugal, Italy and Spain the
total number of municipalities exceeds the number of seats available in parliament by factors of about
1.3, 8.4, and 13.2, respectively.
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ranked C -candidate from municipality f would have been elected at the expense of the




). Hence, Marginc = 0.04
and Marginf = −0.04.
Table 1: Hypothetical closed-list PR district with five seats allocated to three parties
Party A (50,000 votes) Party B (40,000 votes) Party C (10,000 votes)
Divisor
1.4 35,714 (1) 28,571 (2) 7,143
3 16,667 (3) 13,333 (4) 3,333
5 10,000 (5) 8,000 2,000
7 7,143 5,714 1,429
9 5,556 4,444 1,111
Party A candidates Party B candidates Party C candidates
1. Municipality a ! 1. Municipality b ! 1. Municipality f
2. Municipality b ! 2. Municipality b ! 2. Municipality a
3. Municipality c ! 3. Municipality d 3. Municipality b
4. Municipality d 4. Municipality d 4. Municipality c
5. Municipality e 5. Municipality f 5. Municipality d
Note: The table illustrates how five seats in a hypothetical closed-list PR district are allocated to three parties (A, B,
and C) on the basis of the Modified Sainte-Laguë allocation method (as in our empirical case of Norway). This method
distributes seats in consecutive rounds to the party with the most votes following consecutive divisions by a series of
divisors (1.4, 3, 5, 7, 9, ...). In the example, the district consists of six municipalities (a-f). Three of these municipalities
have a local candidate elected (a, b, and c). The other three remain without local representation (d, e, and f). In the top
portion of the table, boldface indicates seats allocated (the number in parentheses indicates the order of allocation); in the
bottom portion of the table, checkmarks indicate which candidates are elected from each party.
Even if it can be assumed that parties assemble their tickets strategically—anticipating
the reactions of voters and aiming to maximize vote shares—the party selectorate cannot
entirely control which candidates ultimately get elected. Unlike in many SMD systems,
all districts in closed-list PR systems tend to feature close competition (Cox, Fiva and
Smith, 2020), so it is difficult to predict seat allocation outcomes, especially for the final
seat allocated in each district.
Using this quasi-experimental variation stemming from the electoral rules, we isolate
the effect of local representation on our main outcome variables (Ymt or Ypmt) capturing
10
local party vote share and turnout. Our baseline empirical specification is a standard RD
regression of the following form:
Ymt = α + βWin1mt + λ1Marginmt + λ2Marginmt · Win1mt + ξmt, (1)
where Win1mt is a dummy variable capturing whether a candidate from municipality
m wins a first-tier seat in parliament in election year t (Marginmt > 0). Equation (1)
allows the slope of the regression line to differ on either side of the cutoff by including
interaction terms between Marginmt and Win1mt. ξmt is an error term.
We limit the sample to municipalities and parties with candidates who are within 5
percentage points from winning a first-tier seat.19 There is no evidence of any sorting
around the threshold for a seat change, lending support to the key identifying assumption
of the RD design, and pre-treatment characteristics are also balanced around the thresh-
old.20 In contrast, if we naively compare all hometowns with and without representation,
there are dramatic imbalances.21 For example, municipalities represented in parliament
by a hometown legislator have almost four times as many inhabitants as municipalities
without such local representation.
We can expand our baseline model by taking into account second-tier seats (Win2mt):
Ymt = α + β(Win1mt + Win2 mt) + λ1Marginmt + λ2Marginmt · Win1mt + ξmt. (2)
We also estimate versions of this equation including various fixed effects (party, time,
district, and rank). In what follows, we provide standard RD plots based on estimations
from Equation (1), and present the full results, based on Equation (2), in table format.
Estimates of β are insensitive to the specification chosen, but we gain some precision
19We further exclude cases in which the municipality has more than one marginal candidate, or also
has a “safe” candidate winning a first-tier seat by a larger margin (like municipalities a and b in Table
1. When looking at party-municipality (pm) level outcomes, the sample restriction is that there is only
one marginal candidate and no safe candidates from the same municipality and party.
20Appendix Figure A.3 gives the frequency of observations for our baseline sample. See Appendix
Figures A.4 and A.5 for municipality-level and candidate-level balance checks, respectively.
21See Appendix Table A.1.
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when using Equation (2).
Main Results
To investigate the impact of local representation on voter behavior, we construct a vari-
able of local electoral support, Local Support, for party p in municipality m in election
district d at time t defined as Local Supportpmdt = Vote Sharepmdt − Vote Sharepdt,−m.
A positive value for Local Support thus indicates that party p receives higher support
in municipality m than it does in the rest of the district where m belongs—i.e., m can
be considered a “party stronghold” within the district. We are interested in how the
change in Local Support from one election to the next, ∆Local Supportpmd,t+4, is related
to whether party p has a candidate from municipality m who is elected to parliament at
time t.22
We also consider whether local representation affects local turnout in municipality m
in district d at time t with a second variable defined as Local Turnoutmdt = Turnoutmdt−
Turnoutdt,−m. When voter turnout in m is higher than in the rest of the district where
m belongs, then Local Turnout > 0. We investigate whether ∆Local Turnoutmd,t+4 is
affected by local representation (by any party’s candidate).
Figure 2 shows how local party support changes when crossing the threshold for
winning a first-tier seat. The upper-left panel shows that the effect on local support in the
current election (Local Supportpmd,t) is close to zero, indicating that there is no selection
around the threshold with respect to local support. Local support is higher for marginal
candidates at both sides of the cutoff for a first-tier seat. This may either indicate that
parties nominate candidates from municipalities that are ex ante party strongholds, or
that support increases when the party has a local candidate with a chance of winning a
seat.
The upper-middle panel, however, shows that a party’s local support tends to be
22Norwegian elections take place every four years. Because our later analyses of redistributive outcomes
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Figure 2: RD plots showing the effect of local representation on party support and turnout
Note: The vertical axis in the top (bottom) left panel shows the party’s vote share (turnout) in the municipality minus
its vote share (turnout) elsewhere in the district (i.e., excluding the focal municipality) in the current national election.
The vertical axis in the right panels shows the changes in the corresponding variable from the current to the next election.
The horizontal axis shows the margin by which the candidate wins a first-tier seat in the current national election. The
dependent variable is party vote share (turnout) in the municipality minus party vote share (turnout) in the district. In
the upper panels, the sample is limited to municipalities in which the party has exactly one marginal candidate, defined
as those within 5 percentage points from winning a first-tier seat, and no candidate winning a first-tier seat by a larger
margin. In the lower panels, the sample is limited to municipalities with exactly one candidate (from any party) who is
within 5 percentage points from winning a first-tier seat and no candidate winning a first-tier seat by a larger margin.
Each bin represents an interval of half a percentage point. Separate linear regression lines are estimated to the left and
right of the discontinuity using the underlying data, not the binned scatterpoints.
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higher in the next election (Local Supportpmd,t+4) in municipalities where a local candi-
date from the party narrowly wins election, compared to municipalities where the party
narrowly misses out on electing a local candidate. We gain precision when taking the first-
difference in local support (∆Local Supportpmd,t+4), as reflected by the smaller confidence
intervals in the top-right panel of Figure 2. These estimates indicate that local party
support increases by about 1 percentage point at the cutoff. This may signify that voters
reward parties with local incumbents, or alternatively, that local incumbents are better
able to mobilize voters than local newcomers. We find no evidence that relative turnout
in the municipality increases (see the bottom panels of Figure 2), which suggests that the
presence of a local incumbent might primarily serve to persuade the erstwhile supporters
of other parties to switch their support to the local incumbent’s party. An alternative
possibility is that the mobilization of previous abstainers is offset by the demobilization
of local supporters of other parties.23
About 8 percent of candidates barely missing out on a first-tier seat do ultimately get
elected into parliament through the allocation of second-tier seats (see Appendix Figure
A.6). The jumps at the cutoff in Figure 2 should therefore be interpreted as intention-
to-treat estimates. Table 2 provides the corresponding regression results, where we also
take second-tier seats into account. As in the graphical evidence, Panel A shows that
winning a seat in parliament increases relative local party support by about a percentage
point. This corresponds to about a third of a standard deviation increase in the dependent
variable. There is no evidence that the effects of local representation on party support are
different for first-tier and second-tier winners, and combining these into a single dummy
variable moderately increases statistical precision. The key estimates are statistically
significant and robust to the inclusion of various fixed effects and to using a triangular
kernel.24
23This might be viewed as analogous to what Gay (2001) finds with regard to African American
representation and the participation of white voters in the United States.
24In Appendix Table A.2, we show regression results corresponding to the middle panels of Figure
2, where outcome variables are specified in levels rather than differences. The results are similar, but
somewhat less precise and less robust to alternative specifications. We further verify that our results
hold when relaxing the sample restriction described in footnote 19 (Appendix Table A.3), and for other
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Table 2: The effects of local representation on party support and turnout
Panel A: Change in local party support (relative to rest of district)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1st tier seat 0.011
(0.003)
2nd tier seat 0.011
(0.003)
1st or 2nd tier seat 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.009
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Mean of outcome var. -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.02
Observations 1250 1250 1250 1250 1250 1250 1250
Panel B: Change in local voter turnout (relative to rest of district)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1st tier seat 0.000
(0.003)
2nd tier seat 0.007
(0.002)
1st or 2nd tier seat 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Mean of outcome var. -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.01
Observations 671 671 671 671 671 671 671
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Party fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes No
District fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes No
Rank fixed effects No No No No No Yes No
Kernel Unif. Unif. Unif. Unif. Unif. Unif. Tria.
Note: In panel A, the dependent variable is the increase from the current to the next election in the party’s vote share
in the municipality minus its vote share at the district level (excluding the focal municipality). The sample is limited to
municipalities in which the party has exactly one marginal candidate, defined as those within 5 percentage points from
winning a first-tier seat, and no candidate winning a first-tier seat by a larger margin. In panel B, the dependent variable
is the increase in turnout in the municipality minus turnout at the district level (excluding the focal municipality). The
sample is limited to municipalities with exactly one marginal candidate (from any party) and no candidate winning a
first-tier seat by a larger margin. All specifications include a linear control function on both sides of the electoral threshold
and dummies for the periods 1989-2001 and 2005-2009, during which two different systems for allocating second-tier seats
were in place. Standard errors are based on a cluster-robust covariance matrix, with clustering on the district level.
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Panel B of Table 2 shows the corresponding results when using local turnout (relative
to average turnout in the other parts of the district) as the outcome variable. There
are no clear indications that turnout is affected positively or negatively. There is some
indication that winners of second-tier seats boost local turnout, but the estimated effect
becomes weaker with the inclusion of the various fixed effects.
Exploring the Mechanisms
In this section, we explore three possible mechanisms behind the increase in party support
in municipalities that gain local representation: renomination of local incumbents to
prominent list positions, symbolic representation of hometowns through legislative speech,
and central-to-local redistribution.
Renomination at the top
In an earlier study using the same data set, Fiva and Smith (2018) document a strong
incumbency advantage for Norwegian legislators. Once a candidate is elected, he or she
often gets renominated to list positions that are high enough (lower numerically) to secure
a seat again in the next election. While Fiva and Smith (2018) emphasize outcomes at
the candidate level, we investigate below how winning a seat affects nomination outcomes
at the municipality level. In particular, we look at the probability of having a local top
candidate.
Figure 2 (top-right panel) in the main analysis shows that relative local party support
tends to fall in municipalities with a homegrown candidate just barely missing out on
a seat, in comparison to municipalities with a local candidate who just barely wins a
seat.25 The top-left panel of Figure 3 shows that in about half of all cases, having a local
choices of bandwidths around the seat threshold (Appendix Figure A.7). The results are also consistent if
we exclude observations prior to the municipality mergers described in footnote 10 and Appendix Figure
A.1 (Appendix Table A.4).
25Considering larger geographic units, we find no evidence that the party enjoys a local advantage
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Figure 3: RD plots showing the effect of local representation on subsequent nominations
Note: The vertical axis indicates the probability that the candidate, or any other candidate from the same party and
municipality, is ranked in the position indicated in the panel heading. The horizontal axis shows the margin by which the
candidate wins a first-tier seat in the current national election. The sample is limited to municipalities in which the party
has exactly one marginal candidate, defined as those within 5 percentage points from winning a first-tier seat, and no
candidate winning a first-tier seat by a larger margin. Each bin represents an interval of half a percentage point. Separate
linear regression lines are estimated to the left and right of the discontinuity using the underlying data, not the binned
scatterpoints.
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marginal candidate already implies having that candidate at the top of the list. The
top-right panel shows that, even if the local candidate wins, the probability of having
a top-ranked local candidate is slightly lower in the next election. However, if a local
candidate loses, the probability falls much more. This suggests that renomination of local
candidates at the top of the ballot is an important driver of local party support, and that
this contributes to the pattern documented in Figure 2.26 The lower panels of Figure 3
show no effects on the probabilities of a local candidate being ranked second.27
If the effect of representation on party support in the next election is driven solely by
the (re)nomination of a local candidate to the top of the party list, our results imply that
having a local top candidate increases a party’s local vote share by about 3 percentage
points relative to other parts of the district.28 This is comparable to the home-county
advantage documented by Rice and Macht (1987) and Meredith (2013) for gubernatorial
races in the United States. It is also similar to the municipality-level vote advantage
enjoyed by local Norwegian candidates in an earlier period from 1906 to 1918 when a
two-round SMD system was in use (Fiva and Smith, 2017a). Given that closed-list PR
systems are regarded as less candidate-centered, this finding of a local representation
effect on friends-and-neighbors voting is remarkable. A feature which might explain this
pattern is that each party often wins only one or a few seats per district, which gives the
top candidate a prominent position for attracting media attention in campaigns.
hometown would prefer having their own local candidate at the top of the list, something that becomes
less likely when a candidate from another municipality wins and runs again.
26The top-left panel of Figure 3 indicates that candidates who (marginally) win seats are somewhat
more likely to be top candidates also in the current election. However, Appendix Table A.5, column (6),
which includes rank-fixed effects, shows that this slight imbalance is not driving the effect in the next
election.
27Nor do we find any substantial effects of local representation in parliament on the probability of
having a local candidate ranked third, fourth, or fifth (see Appendix Figure A.8).
28According to the regression results (Table 2 and A.5, column (2)), the effect on having a local top




An additional potential mechanism is that local incumbents could be able to attract
local voters’ support by talking about their hometowns in parliamentary debates. Leg-
islative debates are an important arena for providing symbolic representation for local
constituencies (e.g., Proksch and Slapin, 2012; Alemán, Ramı́rez and Slapin, 2017; Zittel,
Nyhuis and Baumann, 2019; Fernandes, Won and Martins, 2020), and politicians may
use their own past experiences and local concerns as reference points in debating policy
and advocating ideas. This kind of activity might get coverage in local newspapers, and
facilitate local credit-claiming efforts.
Anecdotal evidence that legislators talk about their home municipalities is easy to
find. Consider, as examples, the following legislators’ speeches in Storting debates on
May 2, 2011, concerning the InterCity railway project connecting the municipalities of
Skien, Lillehammer, and Halden, through Oslo:
Gorm Kjernli (from Ski): “We need more comprehensive developments of
lines, and we must ensure rational progress of the projects, as we now do with
Oslo-Ski, a unified project with its own project management, a separate item
on the budget to ensure good progress, and regulatory planning partly subject
to state regulations.”
Olemic Thommessen (from Lillehammer): “I regularly take the train from
Lillehammer, which is the end terminal of the intercity railway. From Lille-
hammer to, for example, Bjørli, Skj̊ak, Grotli or Lom—all of which are part
of my district—it takes another two and a half hours...to drive by car. But
for this area, the contact with Oslo is just as important... We need well-
functioning communication lines.”
To further investigate whether legislators devote more attention to their hometowns
in speeches, we make use of text data from The Talk of Norway, a data set of legislative
speeches covering the 1998 to 2016 period (Lapponi et al., 2018). Using data for the
three complete four-year parliamentary sessions covered by this data set (2001-2013), we
analyze whether legislator i mentions municipality m in each four-year session s.
Figure 4 displays the average share of legislators who mention municipalities of three
categorical types: municipalities outside the legislator’s district, municipalities inside the
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legislator’s district but excluding the legislator’s hometown, and the hometown of the
legislator. The figure shows that the vast majority of legislators mention their hometown
during a session (73 percent). Other municipalities receive much less attention. On
average, legislators mention 22 percent (4 percent) of other municipalities inside (outside)














Outside district Inside district Hometown
Figure 4: Share of legislators mentioning hometown vs. other municipalities
Note: Based on mentions in legislative speeches from The Talk of Norway (Lapponi et al., 2018). Bars represent the
average share of municipalities mentioned by a legislator by three categories: municipalities outside the legislator’s districts,
municipalities inside the legislator’s district excluding his or her hometown, and the legislator’s hometown. The sample
includes speeches by legislators in the 2001-2013 period (N=101,143). In this period, 435 municipalities existed and 255
legislators served in parliament. To match municipalities to mentions, we exclude municipality names consisting of more
than one word (20 municipalities), municipality names that do not uniquely identify municipalities (12 municipalities),
and one municipality that changed its name during the period. We also exclude Oslo. There are some cases where a
municipality name coincides with a legislator’s name. We eliminate speeches referring to these legislators from our “hits.”
29Appendix Figure A.9 show RD plots using mentions in parliament as the outcome variable. The
probability of being mentioned by party-district legislators increases by more than 20 percentage points
for municipalities that gain representation. Appendix Table A.6 presents additional specifications.
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Distributive policy outcomes
Finally, it is possible that some of this locally-oriented legislative speaking activity co-
incides with actual distributive policy benefits going to the represented municipalities,
which may also motivate some local voters to switch party allegiances and support the
party of the local incumbent.
In candidate-centered electoral systems, it is well documented that legislators reward
favored subconstituencies with redistributive fiscal transfers and other forms of privileged
representation and constituency service (e.g., Hirano, 2006). In closed-list PR systems,
in contrast, the incentives to provide such benefits are theoretically diminished, since an
individual legislator’s reelection depends first and foremost on being reselected by the
party, and then on being nominated to a rank position that is high enough to secure a
seat given the party’s vote share in the district (Carey and Shugart, 1995).30 However, the
Norwegian government routinely promotes redistribution to support settlement and eco-
nomic activity across the country, and these distributive benefits may disproportionately
go to regions that are overrepresented or strategically important to parties’ reelection in-
terests (Helland and Sørensen, 2009; Tavits, 2009; Fiva and Halse, 2016; Rickard, 2018).
It is possible that municipalities with representation from a locally-connected legislator in
parliament might gain an advantage in the within-district allocation of these distributive
benefits.
To evaluate this potential mechanism, we use three different outcome variables that
vary at the municipality-year level: (1) constructions on national roads, (2) central gov-
ernment jobs, and (3) investment funding from the central government.31 The unit of
analysis is municipality m at time t. As with our other outcome variables, we run RD
analyses with these three distributive policy outcomes.
A challenge with these variables is that there is likely to be a time lag between
30André and Depauw (2018) report survey evidence that many legislators in closed-list PR systems
profess to pay more attention to the interests of their hometowns than their districts at large. In the
specific case of Norway, Heidar and Karlsen (2018) also provide qualitative evidence that legislators view
local constituency representation as part of their jobs.
31Appendix B describes each of these policy outcome variables in detail.
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the stage at which the incumbent might influence the decision-making process and the
observed outcome. We therefore analyze the effect of representation in parliament on
policy outcomes both during the current and the next election period. In the case of
road constructions, we add another two-year lag to account for the fact that the data are
based on the opening year of the construction, not the year when construction starts.
Figure 5 shows how winning a first-tier seat affects each of the three policy outcomes,
based on a five-percentage-point bandwidth around the electoral threshold. There is no
evidence of a positive effect on any of these policies during the current election period,
nor is there an effect in the next period. As clearly shown in the left panels, there is
also no evidence that the sample is unbalanced in terms of policy outcomes during the
previous period. Appendix Table A.7 confirms the findings from the graphical analysis
and documents that we have quite precisely estimated zeros.32 These results suggest that
marginally elected legislators do not influence redistributive policies in a direction that
benefits their hometowns during the eight years following their election. However, we
cannot rule out that there could be some legislators who are more influential (i.e., those
in safer seats), or that it takes an even longer time in parliament before the effect of local
representation materializes.33
For valid causal inferences, the RD design on which we rely is crucial. A naive
comparison of hometowns with and without representation would lead to the erroneous
conclusion that local representation results in fewer geographically-targeted benefits (see
Appendix Table A.1). This is a consequence of the ambitious Norwegian redistribution
scheme which tends to favor rural areas (typically without representation) over urban
areas (typically with representation).
32We calculate 95% confidence intervals based on specification (5) in Appendix Table A.7. We find that
the upper bounds on these confidence intervals are 0.04, 0.15, and 0.49, respectively, when standardizing
the three policy outcome measures by their standard deviations. The null findings for policy outcomes
are insensitive to the bandwidth chosen (Appendix Figure A.7).
33In the election period from 2001 to 2005, the parliament approved moving eight central government
agencies out of Oslo. According to various sources, this process was completed within the next election
period. We also do not find evidence of any substantial heterogeneous effects on local support or turnout
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Figure 5: RD plots showing the effect of local representation on redistribution outcomes
Note: Policy outcomes are measured at the hometown (municipality) level. In the top panels, the hometowns of candidates
are mapped into the municipality structure of 2014. The horizontal axis shows the margin by which the candidate wins
a first-tier seat in the current national election. The sample in the top panel consists of all elections from 1953 to 2009.
The sample in the two bottom panels consists of elections from 1973 to 2009. Road constructions are regarded as built
in an election period if they are completed two years after the years included in the period (e.g., between 2008 and 2011
for the 2006-2009 period). The sample is limited to municipalities with exactly one candidate who is within 5 percentage
points from winning a first-tier seat and no candidate winning a first-tier seat by a larger margin. Each bin represents an
interval of half a percentage point. Separate linear regression lines are estimated to the left and right of the discontinuity
using the underlying data, not the binned scatterpoints.
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Together, the results of the preceding analyses suggest that the connection between
local representation and party support may be more related to the mobilizational ad-
vantages of incumbents, or symbolic representation through their legislative speech, than
to any material benefits they deliver to their hometown municipalities. However, the
full extent of the impact of local representation on additional policy outcomes requires
further investigation, and is an important research question for future inquiry.
Conclusion
Across democracies, there is a tendency for legislators to reside in the districts they
represent, and many have deeper local roots from birth and upbringing (Gallagher and
Marsh, 1988).34 However, because districts frequently contain more municipalities than
seats, not all municipalities will be represented in parliament by a legislator with strong
local ties, and this can potentially affect patterns in voting behavior among local citizens.
In this study, we have taken advantage of detailed data on Norwegian candidates’
hometowns, and vote returns measured at the municipality level, to examine whether
the descriptive representation of geographical subregions (municipalities) within electoral
districts affects voting behavior in a closed-list PR system—a commonly used electoral
system around the world that has nevertheless been neglected by existing studies of
friends-and-neighbors voting.
The conventional wisdom from comparative theories of electoral systems and repre-
sentation is that local representation should have a minimal effect on voter behavior in
closed-list PR systems, since voters cast their ballots for parties rather than candidates,
policies tend to be nationally-oriented rather than locally-oriented, and parties typically
maintain strong control over the legislative agenda, making it harder for individual leg-
islators to engage in the kind of behavior in parliament that might win local votes back
34A normative argument can be made that districts ought to be represented by legislators with strong
local ties (Childs and Cowley, 2011), and even candidates who “parachute” into a district from elsewhere
face strong pressures to set up residency in their new districts. In some cases, such as the United States,
residency is required by law.
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in their districts (e.g., Carey and Shugart, 1995; Shugart, Valdini and Suominen, 2005;
Proksch and Slapin, 2012).
Our findings suggest that this conventional wisdom is not entirely unequivocal. We
document a clear pattern of geographic balancing across candidate nominations, and a
clear mobilizational benefit to parties when a local candidate wins election. Our ex-
ploration of the mechanisms behind this apparent friends-and-neighbors effect suggests
that the presence of a local incumbent at the top of the party list serves to persuade
the erstwhile supporters of other parties to switch their support, rather than to mobilize
abstainers. We also find that legislators’ hometowns are more frequently mentioned in
legislative speeches, but do not appear to gain any special benefits in terms of central-
to-local redistribution.
It is, however, important to note some scope limitations to our findings and how
they should be interpreted in light of our exploration of the mechanisms, particularly
with regard to distributive policies. As we have noted, the candidate selection process
in Norway is, by law, carried out by district nomination committees made up of local
party representatives, with no direct influence of national party leaders. This means that
a legislator may have incentives to pay attention to local interests in order to please
his or her local selectorate. We find null effects for distributive policies even in this
context, which suggests that in systems where the selectorate is composed of national
party leaders, the effects of local representation are also unlikely to be significant—but
this cannot be tested with our data. Future research with data from additional closed-
list PR cases where the selection process is not fixed by law, such as Portugal or Israel,
should investigate whether the connection between local representation and local political
outcomes varies by the degree of centralization in the candidate selection process.35
In addition, our RD approach leverages as-if-random outcomes for marginal candidates
within a narrow bandwidth of all candidates. This sample constraint is important for
35Fernandes, Won and Martins (2020) show descriptive evidence that mentions in legislative speech
of districts as a whole tend to vary across legislators from parties employing different selection proce-
dures, but the authors do not investigate within-district variation in mentions according to legislators’
hometowns.
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identifying the causal effect of local representation, but because we only estimate the local
average treatment effect (LATE), our analysis might not capture important variation
across the full range of candidates and legislators. For example, marginal candidates
(who are in our sample) may have greater incentives to exert mobilizational effort than
safe or hopeless candidates (who are not). At the same time, marginal incumbents might
have less power to affect distributive outcomes due to lower seniority in the party (to the
extent that more senior legislators are given safe list positions). As a legislator’s election
security improves, it is possible that he or she might have more power to influence “costly”
distributive policies, and less need to focus on local representation through relatively
“costless” behavior like legislative speech—in other words, the null effect we uncover for
the former mechanism behind local party support, and the positive evidence we show
for the latter mechanism, might not be uniform across legislators of different levels of
seniority.
Finally, in examining the distributive policy outcomes for municipalities, we have fo-
cused on the overall effect of local representation, without considering potential variation
that might exist across legislators who serve on different parliamentary committees. The
existing literature suggests that some committees are more conducive to bringing home
particularistic benefits than others (e.g., Stratmann and Baur, 2002). Moreover, com-
mittee strength in general varies across countries (Mattson and Strøm, 1995). Future
research should therefore investigate whether the effects of local representation differ de-
pending on the committee membership of elected legislators, as well as whether the effects
vary by country-level factors such as the strength of committees or other differences in
legislative organization.
In addition to these possible extensions, our findings also raise opportunities for fur-
ther investigation into local representation and distributive politics in closed-list PR sys-
tems. According to our results, representation does not matter for the allocation of public
resources within the electoral district in this setting. An open question is whether the
distribution of representation for local municipalities within districts affects the allocation
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between districts. For example, Helland and Sørensen (2009) find that Norwegian dis-
tricts with more seats relative to the population receive more national road investments,
and Halse (2016) finds that investments in regional public roads are lower when many
regional council members come from the more heavily populated areas in the region. This
latter finding accords with a model of distributive politics that predicts greater amounts
of spending on local public goods when the geographical constituency of each legisla-
tor is small (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnson, 1981). Such a theory implies that more
spending might be directed to a district when a greater number of municipalities within
that district gain representation, particularly if each legislator in the district came from a
different municipality of small-to-medium population size rather than several legislators
coming from the same municipality of a larger population size. This implication cannot
be addressed using the research design we employ in this study, but it is an important
topic for future research.
References
Aardal, Bernt. 2002. Electoral Systems in Norway. In The Evolution of Electoral and
Party Systems in the Nordic Countries, ed. B. Grofman and A. Lijphart. New York:
Agathon Press pp. 167–224.
Alemán, Eduardo, Margarita M. Ramı́rez and Jonathan B. Slapin. 2017. “Party
Strategies, Constituency Links, and Legislative Speech.” Legislative Studies Quarterly
42(4):637–659.
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Figure A.1: Norwegian municipalities and local ties
Note: The left panel shows the number of municipalities by election year. The middle panel shows the fraction of legislators
residing in the electoral district where they were elected. The right panel shows the fraction of municipalities where at
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Figure A.2: Geographic balancing in candidate nominations for the top five list positions
in the four largest parties
Note: The figure plots, for each of the four largest parties, the number of municipalities represented by candidates in the top
five positions on the lists against the expected number from a random draw based on populations. The unit of observation
is the party-district-year level (N=1,085). At the dashed 45-degree line, municipalities are, on average, represented on the
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Figure A.3: Frequency of observations
Note: In the top panel, the sample is limited to municipalities with exactly one marginal candidate (from any party),
defined as those within 5 percentage points from winning a first-tier seat, and no candidate winning a first-tier seat by a
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Figure A.4: Balance of hometown characteristics around the electoral threshold for win-
ning a first-tier seat
Note: The horizontal axis shows the margin by which the candidate wins a first-tier seat in the current national election.
The sample is limited to municipalities with exactly one marginal candidate, defined as those within 5 percentage points
from winning a first-tier seat, and no candidate winning a first-tier seat by a larger margin. Each bin represents an
interval of half a percentage point. Separate linear regression lines are estimated to the left and right of the discontinuity
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Figure A.5: Balance of candidate characteristics around the electoral threshold for win-
ning a first-tier seat
Note: The horizontal axis shows the margin by which the candidate wins a first-tier seat in the current national election.
The sample is limited to municipalities with exactly one marginal candidate, defined as those within 5 percentage points
from winning a first-tier seat, and no candidate winning a first-tier seat by a larger margin. Each bin represents an
interval of half a percentage point. Separate linear regression lines are estimated to the left and right of the discontinuity
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Figure A.6: RD plot showing how local representation changes at the cutoff for winning
a first-tier seat
Note: The sample is limited to municipalities in which the party has exactly one marginal candidate, defined as those
within 5 percentage points from winning a first-tier seat, and no candidate winning a first-tier seat by a larger margin.
Each bin represents an interval of half a percentage point. Separate linear regression lines are estimated to the left and
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Figure A.7: Sensitivity to bandwidth choice of the effect of local representation on main
outcome variables
Note: The graphs shows the results from the models reported in column column (2) of Table 2, column (2) of Table A.5
and column (3) of Table A.7 for different bandwidths on both sides of the electoral threshold. The bandwidth is indicated
on the horizontal axis. The solid line represents the point estimates. The dashed lines represent 95 percent confidence
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Figure A.8: RD plots showing the effect of local representation on the probability of
having a local candidate ranked third, fourth, or fifth
Note: The vertical axis indicates the probability that the candidate, or any other candidate from the same party and
municipality, is ranked in the position indicated in the panel heading. The horizontal axis shows the margin by which the
candidate wins a first-tier seat in the current national election. The sample is limited to municipalities in which the party
has exactly one marginal candidate, defined as those within 5 percentage points from winning a first-tier seat, and no
candidate winning a first-tier seat by a larger margin. Each bin represents an interval of half a percentage point. Separate
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Figure A.9: RD plots showing the effect of local representation on parliamentary speech
mentions
Note: The horizontal axis shows the margin by which the candidate wins a first-tier seat in the current national election.
The sample consists of all elections from 1997 to 2013. Speech data is from the Talk of Norway project (Lapponi et al.,
2018) which covers the 1998-2016 period and includes 250,000 unique speeches. We exclude speeches by the president
and vice-president (73,000 observations), speeches by candidates of non-main parties (2,000 observations), and speeches
lacking electoral district information (18,000 observations, typically speeches by cabinet members promoted from outside
the Storting). In the top panel, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for if the hometown of a candidate is mentioned
by any legislator in the relevant election period. The sample is limited to municipalities with exactly one marginal candidate
(from any party), defined as those within 5 percentage points distance from winning a first-tier seat, and no candidate
winning a first-tier seat by a larger margin. In the bottom panel, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for if the
hometown of a candidate is mentioned by any legislator from the party of the candidate in the relevant election period.
The sample is limited to municipalities in which the party has exactly one marginal candidate, defined as those within 5
percentage points distance from winning a first-tier seat, and no candidate winning a first-tier seat by a larger margin.
Each bin represents an interval of half a percentage point. Separate linear regression lines are estimated to the left and
right of the discontinuity using the underlying data, not the binned scatterpoints.
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics by parliamentary representation, all hometowns
Panel A: Municipality-level outcomes
No seat Seat Difference N
Local voter turnout (rel. to rest of district, current election) -0.007 0.004 0.011*** 7,889
(0.044) (0.034) (0.001)
∆ Local voter turnout (rel. to rest of district, next election) 0.001 -0.001 -0.003*** 7,031
(0.026) (0.019) (0.001)
Hometown mentioned in parliament 0.808 0.949 0.141*** 2,083
(0.394) (0.220) (0.018)
New road constructions (meter/100 inhabitants) 0.823 0.562 -0.261** 7,001
(3.321) (1.753) (0.090)
Central gov. employees (increase/100 inhab.) -0.006 0.001 0.007 4,357
(1.263) (0.633) (0.041)
Inv. funding from central gov. (1000 NOK/inhab.) 2.540 1.893 -0.646*** 4,217
(3.249) (2.161) (0.110)
Latitude 62.356 61.888 -0.467*** 7,955
(3.503) (3.338) (0.096)
Longitude 10.521 10.412 -0.109 7,955
(4.759) (4.427) (0.130)
Area 762.607 721.375 -41.232 7,955
(877.973) (835.182) (24.010)
Population (1000) 4.599 17.176 12.577*** 7,955
(4.812) (26.558) (0.355)
Regional capital 0.037 0.146 0.109*** 7,955
(0.188) (0.353) (0.006)
National roads (km) 63.986 75.995 12.009*** 7,955
(41.835) (47.432) (1.189)
Panel B: Party-municipality-level outcomes
No seat Seat Difference N
Local party support (rel. to rest of district, current election) -0.001 0.031 0.033*** 48,048
(0.071) (0.079) (0.002)
∆ Local party support (rel. to rest of district, next election) 0.000 -0.005 -0.005*** 41,415
(0.026) (0.029) (0.001)
Local candidate ranked first (next election) 0.060 0.473 0.413*** 12,332
(0.238) (0.499) (0.008)
Local candidate ranked second (next election) 0.091 0.230 0.139*** 12,332
(0.288) (0.421) (0.008)
Hometown mentioned in parliament by legislator from same party 0.325 0.865 0.539*** 14,581
(0.469) (0.342) (0.018)
Note: In panel A, the unit of observation is at the municipality-year level. In panel B, the unit of observation is at the
party-municipality-year level.
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Table A.2: The effects of local representation on party support and turnout, measured
in levels instead of changes
Panel A: Change in local party support (relative to rest of district)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1st tier seat 0.016
(0.008)
2nd tier seat 0.017
(0.007)
1st or 2nd tier seat 0.016 0.016 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.012
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Mean of outcome var. 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.030
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.03
Observations 1250 1250 1250 1250 1250 1250 1250
Panel B: Change in local voter turnout (relative to rest of district)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1st tier seat -0.004
(0.005)
2nd tier seat 0.003
(0.005)
1st or 2nd tier seat -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Mean of outcome var. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.00
Observations 671 671 671 671 671 671 671
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Party fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes No
District fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes No
Rank fixed effects No No No No No Yes No
Kernel Unif. Unif. Unif. Unif. Unif. Unif. Tria.
Note: In panel A, the dependent variable is the party’s vote share in the municipality minus its vote share at the district
level (excluding the focal municipality) in the next election. The sample is limited to municipalities in which the party has
exactly one marginal candidate, defined as those within 5 percentage points from winning a first-tier seat, and no candidate
winning a first-tier seat by a larger margin. In panel B, the dependent variable is turnout in the municipality minus turnout
at the district level (excluding the focal municipality) in the next election. The sample is limited to municipalities with
exactly one marginal candidate (from any party) and no candidate winning a first-tier seat by a larger margin. All
specifications include a linear control function on both sides of the electoral threshold and dummies for the periods 1989-
2001 and 2005-2009, during which two different systems for allocating second-tier seats were in place. Standard errors
are based on a cluster-robust covariance matrix, with clustering on the district level.
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Table A.3: The effects of local representation on party support and turnout, including
municipalities with multiple marginal and/or safe candidates
Panel A: Change in local party support (relative to rest of district)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1st tier seat 0.010
(0.003)
2nd tier seat 0.010
(0.003)
1st or 2nd tier seat 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.008
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Mean of outcome var. -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.02
Observations 1311 1311 1311 1311 1311 1311 1311
Panel B: Change in local voter turnout (relative to rest of district)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1st tier seat -0.001
(0.001)
2nd tier seat 0.002
(0.001)
1st or 2nd tier seat 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mean of outcome var. -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.00
Observations 1311 1311 1311 1311 1311 1311 1311
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Party fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes No
District fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes No
Rank fixed effects No No No No No Yes No
Kernel Unif. Unif. Unif. Unif. Unif. Unif. Tria.
Note: In panel A, the dependent variable is the increase from the current to the next election in the party’s vote share
in the municipality minus its vote share at the district level (excluding the focal municipality). In panel B, the dependent
variable is the increase in turnout in the municipality minus turnout at the district level (excluding the focal municipality).
In both panels, the sample is restricted to hometowns of a marginal candidate, defined as those within 5 percentage points
from winning a first-tier seat. All specifications include a linear control function on both sides of the electoral threshold
and dummies for the periods 1989-2001 and 2005-2009, during which two different systems for allocating second-tier seats
were in place. Standard errors are based on a cluster-robust covariance matrix, with clustering on the district level.
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Table A.4: The effects of local representation on party support and turnout, excluding
elections before municipality mergers (1953-1961)
Panel A: Change in local party support (relative to rest of district)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1st tier seat 0.011
(0.004)
2nd tier seat 0.011
(0.003)
1st or 2nd tier seat 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.009
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Mean of outcome var. -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.12 0.02
Observations 1045 1045 1045 1045 1045 1045 1045
Panel B: Change in local voter turnout (relative to rest of district)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1st tier seat -0.001
(0.003)
2nd tier seat 0.007
(0.002)
1st or 2nd tier seat 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Mean of outcome var. -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
R-squared 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.01
Observations 522 522 522 522 522 522 522
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Party fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes No
District fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes No
Rank fixed effects No No No No No Yes No
Kernel Unif. Unif. Unif. Unif. Unif. Unif. Tria.
Note: These specifications exclude observations prior to a number of municipality mergers that occurred during the time
period of our main sample (see Figure A.1). In panel A, the dependent variable is the increase from the current to the
next election in the party’s vote share in the municipality minus its vote share at the district level (excluding the focal
municipality). The sample is limited to municipalities in which the party has exactly one marginal candidate, defined
as those within 5 percentage points from winning a first-tier seat, and no candidate winning a first-tier seat by a larger
margin. In panel B, the dependent variable is the increase in turnout in the municipality minus turnout at the district level
(excluding the focal municipality). The sample is limited to municipalities with exactly one marginal candidate (from any
party) and no candidate winning a first-tier seat by a larger margin. All specifications include a linear control function
on both sides of the electoral threshold and dummies for the periods 1989-2001 and 2005-2009, during which two different
systems for allocating second-tier seats were in place. Standard errors are based on a cluster-robust covariance matrix,
with clustering on the district level.
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Table A.5: The effects of local representation on the probability of having a local top
candidate in the next election
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1st tier seat 0.297
(0.055)
2nd tier seat 0.467
(0.056)
1st or 2nd tier seat 0.344 0.348 0.289 0.296 0.268 0.318
(0.054) (0.055) (0.052) (0.051) (0.055) (0.054)
Mean of outcome var. 0.307 0.307 0.307 0.307 0.307 0.307 0.324
R-squared 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.20 0.22 0.28 0.10
Observations 1258 1258 1258 1258 1258 1258 1258
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Party fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes No
District fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes No
Rank fixed effects No No No No No Yes No
Kernel Unif. Unif. Unif. Unif. Unif. Unif. Tria.
Note: The sample is limited to municipalities in which the party has exactly one marginal candidate, defined as those
within 5 percentage points from winning a first-tier seat, and no candidate winning a first-tier seat by a larger margin.
All specifications include a linear control function on both sides of the electoral threshold and dummies for the periods
1989-2001 and 2005-2009, during which two different systems for allocating second-tier seats are in place. Standard errors
are based on a cluster-robust covariance matrix, with clustering on the district level.
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Table A.6: The effects of local representation on parliamentary speech mentions
Panel A: Hometown mentioned by any legislator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1st tier seat 0.140
(0.096)
2nd tier seat 0.132
(0.040)
1st or 2nd tier seat 0.136 0.138 0.149 0.177 0.176 0.140
(0.064) (0.064) (0.071) (0.073) (0.076) (0.072)
Mean of outcome var. 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.894
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.16 0.17 0.07
Observations 221 221 221 221 221 221 221
Panel B: Hometown mentioned by any legislator from the same party
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1st tier seat 0.388
(0.041)
2nd tier seat 0.509
(0.040)
1st or 2nd tier seat 0.453 0.451 0.527 0.522 0.557 0.420
(0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.037) (0.040)
Mean of outcome var. 0.664 0.664 0.664 0.664 0.664 0.664 0.706
R-squared 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.23
Observations 470 470 470 470 470 470 470
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Party fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes No
District fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes No
Rank fixed effects No No No No No Yes No
Kernel Unif. Unif. Unif. Unif. Unif. Unif. Tria.
Note: In the top panel, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for if the hometown of a candidate is mentioned by
any legislator in the relevant election period. The sample is limited to municipalities with exactly one marginal candidate
(from any party), defined as those within 5 percentage points distance from winning a first-tier seat, and no candidate
winning a first-tier seat by a larger margin. In the bottom panel, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for if the
hometown of a candidate is mentioned by any legislator from the party of the candidate in the relevant election period.
The sample is limited to municipalities in which the party has exactly one marginal candidate, defined as those within 5
percentage points distance from winning a first-tier seat, and no candidate winning a first-tier seat by a larger margin.
All specifications include a linear control function on both sides of the electoral threshold and dummies for the periods
1989-2001 and 2005-2009, during which two different systems for allocating second-tier seats were in place. Standard
errors are based on a cluster-robust covariance matrix, with clustering on the district level.
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Table A.7: The effects of local representation on redistributive policy outcomes
Panel A: New road constructions (meter/100 inhabitants)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prev. Prev. Curr. Curr. Next Next
1st or 2nd tier seat 0.123 0.032 -0.027 0.077 -0.607 -0.723
(0.212) (0.195) (0.188) (0.164) (0.272) (0.357)
Mean of outcome var. 0.540 0.497 0.544 0.585 0.627 0.615
R-squared 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09
Observations 709 709 662 662 622 622
Panel B: Central government jobs (increase 100/inhabitants)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prev. Prev. Curr. Curr. Next Next
1st or 2nd tier seat -0.109 -0.129 -0.053 -0.054 0.068 -0.059
(0.113) (0.109) (0.065) (0.059) (0.111) (0.100)
Mean of outcome var. -0.046 -0.031 0.039 0.008 0.001 0.033
R-squared 0.10 0.32 0.03 0.20 0.02 0.09
Observations 417 417 467 467 416 416
Panel C: Investment funding (NOK 2015/inhabitant)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prev. Prev. Curr. Curr. Next Next
1st or 2nd tier seat 77.718 462.375 -172.730 -231.389 66.120 187.144
(337.907) (407.182) (356.541) (561.056) (330.357) (284.308)
Mean of outcome var. 2221.073 2102.874 2168.183 2170.322 1860.082 1861.549
R-squared 0.01 0.28 0.02 0.16 0.01 0.19
Observations 395 395 440 440 390 390
YearFE No Yes No Yes No Yes
PartyFE No Yes No Yes No Yes
DistrictFE No Yes No Yes No Yes
RankFE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Kernel Unif. Tria. Unif. Tria. Unif. Tria.
Note: “Prev.”, “Curr.” and “Next” refer to the previous, current and next election period, respectively. Policy outcomes
are measured at the hometown (municipality) level. In the top panel, the hometowns of candidates are mapped to the mu-
nicipality structure of 2014. The sample is limited to municipalities with exactly one candidate who is within 5 percentage
points from winning a first-tier seat and no candidate winning a first-tier seat by a larger margin. All specifications include
a linear control function on both sides of the electoral threshold and dummies for the periods 1989-2001 and 2005-2009.
Standard errors are based on a cluster-robust covariance matrix, with clustering on the district level.
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Table A.8: The effects of local representation on party support, by government alignment
status
Panel A: Candidates from party/parties in government
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1st tier seat 0.008
(0.005)
2nd tier seat 0.010
(0.007)
1st or 2nd tier seat 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Mean of outcome var. -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.005
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.04
Observations 405 405 405 405 405 405 405
Panel B: Candidates from parties not in government
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1st tier seat 0.012
(0.004)
2nd tier seat 0.012
(0.004)
1st or 2nd tier seat 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.010
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Mean of outcome var. -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.03
Observations 845 845 845 845 845 845 845
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Party fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes No
District fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes No
Rank fixed effects No No No No No Yes No
Kernel Unif. Unif. Unif. Unif. Unif. Unif. Tria.
Note: The dependent variable is the increase from the current to the next election in the party’s vote share in the mu-
nicipality minus its vote share at the district level (excluding the focal municipality). In panel A, the sample consists of
candidates from a party that is in government at the end of the election period (i.e., four years later). In panel B, the
sample consists of candidates from a party that is not in government at the end of the period. The sample is further limited
to municipalities in which the party has exactly one marginal candidate, defined as those within 5 percentage points from
winning a first-tier seat, and no candidate winning a first-tier seat by a larger margin. All specifications include a linear
control function on both sides of the electoral threshold and dummies for the periods 1989-2001 and 2005-2009, during
which two different systems for allocating second-tier seats were in place. Standard errors are based on a cluster-robust
covariance matrix, with clustering on the district level.
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Appendix B: Distributive policy outcomes
Our first outcome variable related to distributive politics is construction work on national
roads. Due to its large geographical area and relatively scattered settlement pattern, Nor-
way has a wide and diverse network of public roads—overall totaling 94,000 kilometers.
The network consists of national, regional, and local roads. The national government is
responsible for the national roads, which amounted to 28,000 kilometers before 2010, or
roughly five meters per capita.36 In 2010, a large share of this network was transferred to
the regional road network. Public funding of investments in national roads is allocated in
the national budget, which is approved by parliament at the end of each calendar year.
The time at which a road project is first proposed and discussed in parliament varies
across projects. Since 1970, the government is required to prepare a long-term plan of
road projects to be discussed in parliament. In 2002, this plan was replaced by a national
transport plan covering all modes of transport. The national plan is not a binding legal
document, but rather simply a document of policy intentions. Before receiving funding,
a road project has typically been included at least once in the national plan. Parliament
is involved earlier in the decision-making process in the case of public toll roads, which
must be approved by a vote in parliament.
To identify the local effect of national road policies, we use detailed data on con-
structions on national roads.37 More specifically, our data set includes information on
all bridges built on national roads over the 1953-2013 period, and is collected from the
BRUTUS database of the National Public Roads Administration.38 Given the topol-
ogy of Norway, with its many fjords and mountains, bridges are a major component of
infrastructure investments.
36Road investments made by one level of government are sometimes co-financed by other levels of
government.
37An alternative would be to use map data to identify expansions of the road network. This is less
relevant for the period we study, in which the network was more or less already established.
38We only include constructions on national roads, although the central government sometimes grants
support to projects on the sub-national level. There are also some cases in the database where the
bridge is part of a national road, but listed as part of the local or regional road which it crosses. Data
on other types of constructions (e.g., tunnels) is incomplete and is therefore not used in our analysis.
Seven municipalities have no national roads, and are excluded from our analysis.
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Data on the investment costs of road projects is not available at the municipality level.
Helland and Sørensen (2009) analyze aggregate road investments at the election district
level. In Figure B.1, we compare their data on investments with our data on constructions
at the district level, both cross-sectionally (left panel) and over time within each district
(right panel). The relationship is positive and close to proportional, indicating that bridge
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Figure B.1: Bridges on national roads and total road investments in the election district
Note: The vertical axis reports the total meters of new or rebuilt bridges on national roads within the election district.
The horizontal axis reports national road investments in the district. The left panel compares total constructions and
investments over all years 1964-2000. Each marker (x) in this panel represents one district. The right panel compares
constructions and investments per year, controlling for district fixed effects. Each marker (dot) in this panel is a binned
scatterpoint containing roughly the same number of observations. The linear regression line is based on the underlying
data, not the binned scatterpoints.
Our second outcome variable for redistribution is the number of jobs connected to the
central government located within a local municipality. The core government ministries
and many of the central government agencies are located in Oslo. However, other central
government agencies are located, or have local offices, in other parts of the country. In
some cases, the location of a central government agency in a peripheral region is intended
to ameliorate lower economic activity in the local private sector due to, for example,
structural changes in specific industries. A prominent example is the National Library
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of Norway, which established a division in the northern steel industry city of Mo i Rana
in 1989 that today accounts for about half of the library’s employees.39 Information on
the localization of central government jobs is attached to the national budget documents,
and is provided by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD). The data cover all
years from 1974 to 2012, which allows us to measure the growth in central government
employment during ten of the election periods in our candidate sample.40 The left panel
of Figure B.2 shows that most municipalities have at least one central government po-
sition per 100 inhabitants, and some have many more. The right panel shows that the
change during an election period is small in most municipalities, but that there are some
municipalities that have experienced large decreases or increases.
Finally, for our third outcome measure, we explore the impact of local representation
on fiscal transfers from the central government. While most of the grant allocations from
the central government follow objective criteria, we focus on a type of grant where the
central government has quite a bit of discretion: funding for local public investments.
Based on all local government accounting sheets for each year from 1973-2013, we cal-
culate investment funding per capita during each four-year legislative period between
elections starting with 1974-1977 and ending with 2010-2013. In sum, all three measures
capture distributive policies which are likely to matter for local welfare.
39Mo i Rana was home to the Norsk Jernverk public steel company until 1988, when it was divided
and privatized. Mo i Rana, with a population of about 18,000, is also home to the fee-collecting office
of the public broadcaster NRK, and the central government agency that collects fines and debts to the
central government (Statens Innkrevingssentral). Another example is Statistics Norway, which employs
over a third of its workers in the city of Kongsvinger, 93 kilometers away from the main office in Oslo.
In 2015, Kongsvinger hosted 334 of 877 total employees of Statistics Norway. Kongsvinger also has a
population of about 18,000.
40Until 1998, government positions were registered in October, but have subsequently been registered
in March. Due to data availability issues, our first period of analysis runs from October 1974 to October
1977; the 1993-1997 period runs from October 1993 to March 1998; the 1997-2001 period runs from
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Figure B.2: Central government jobs in the municipality
Note: The left panel shows the frequencies by the number of jobs per 100 inhabitants by the beginning of the election
period. The right panel shows the change in the same measure from the beginning of the election period to the beginning of
the next election period, censored at −5 and +5 employees per 100 inhabitants. Each bar has a width of 0.5. The sample
consists of election periods from 1973-1977 to 2009-2013.
21
